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SOME ETHICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING 
MEDIATION 
Robert P. Burns* 
INTRODUCTION 
A progressively larger portion of the activity of dispute resolution, 
of social ordering,1 occurs through mediation.  Mediation is now the 
preferred method of “alternative dispute resolution,” or, as some of 
its proponents, seeking to dislodge litigation from its position as the 
default method of social ordering, like to put it, “appropriate dispute 
resolution.”2  Large corporations have embraced mediation as a 
method that offers the promise of cost savings as well as maintaining 
the quality of the long-term relationships on which many businesses 
depend.3  It is almost certainly true, however, that in the majority of 
mediations, at least one of the participants, if not both, is a person of 
modest means.  Mediation through neighborhood justice centers or 
community justice centers is available to address disputes among 
neighbors.  The largest employer in the United States sponsors an 
ambitious mediation program to resolve disputes that arise in the 
work place.4  Prosecutors and courts often refer minor, though often 
potentially dangerous, criminal or juvenile matters to mediation.  
Many jurisdictions encourage, or even require, mediation in the half 
of American marriages that end in divorce.  It is increasingly likely 
that individual Americans will participate in mediation and it is thus 
increasingly important that lawyers who represent individuals 
consider seriously the ethical issues that such representation raises. 
In this Essay, I first describe the two most important issues in the 
ethics of negotiation and ask whether mediation conceived as 
facilitated negotiation changes the appropriate resolution of those 
 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. 
 1. Lon Fuller, The Principles of Social Order 27 (1981). 
 2. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial 
Lawyering, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 153, 162 (1999). 
 3. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: 
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 536 
(1994) (providing an economic interpretation of the increasing interest of 
corporations in alternative dispute resolution). 
 4. Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Transforming Workplace Culture Through Mediation: 
Lessons Learned from Swimming Upstream, 18 Hofstra Labor & Employment L.J. 
375 (2001). 
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issues.  Then I shift to a different question, one raised by mediation’s 
most robust claims, to be a mode of social ordering uniquely capable 
of making participants better people, of occasioning moral growth.  
Here I must employ a more philosophical idiom, to explore the terrain 
surrounding the appropriate place of lawyers in “transformative 
mediation.”  I suggest that these very practical questions quickly open 
out to more basic issues concerning what is and what is not possible 
within the social structure that we have created for ourselves, a 
structure in which the moral, political, and legal spheres have relative 
independence from one another. 
I. TWO TRADITIONAL ISSUES IN NEGOTIATION ETHICS 
A. The Question of Truthfulness 
The most important ethical issues surrounding the mediations in 
which lawyers participate relate to:  (1) the appropriate level of 
candor for the dialogue that occurs during the mediations and (2) the 
appropriate division of authority between lawyer and client before 
and during the mediations.  These are the very same issues that 
surround negotiation ethics, though the addition of the mediator 
changes the context within which they arise. 
At one extreme, mediation can simply be facilitated share 
bargaining.  Here the underlying premise of a mediation is that there 
is a relatively fixed pie to divide and that the mediation is a “zero-sum 
game.”  One person’s gain is the other person’s loss and neither party 
gains in any way from the other party’s “success.”  The process of the 
mediation, like share-bargaining negotiation, is employed both to 
determine whether there is a zone of cooperative success, a so-called 
bargaining range created by the overlap between the parties bottom 
lines,5 and then to settle as close to the other party’s bottom line as 
possible.  The ethical issues surrounding this style of negotiation are 
all intertwined with obligations of candor or truthfulness; and one can 
easily see why.  Both parties to this kind of negotiation perceive 
themselves better off settling anywhere in the settlement range 
created by the overlap between bottom lines than not settling.6  But, 
both parties are conceived as solely self-interested and so each is 
better off settling at the point in the settlement range that represents 
precisely the “opponent’s” bottom line.  From a purely self-interested 
point of view, each party is best served by the opponent’s 
 
 5. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating To Create 
Value In Deals and Disputes 18-21 (2000). 
 6. In the jargon, each party’s BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement) is perceived as worse than a negotiated settlement anywhere in the 
settlement range.  See Robert Fisher et al., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving In 97-106 (2d ed. 1991). 
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misunderstanding the party’s own bottom line, believing that it is 
identical to his own.  So if a plaintiff will settle for $10,000 and a 
defendant will offer as much as $20,000 to avoid further litigation, it is 
in our purely self-interested plaintiff’s interest that the defendant 
perceive that he will accept no less than $20,000.  For it is still in the 
interest of the defendant that he settle for $20,000 rather than go to 
trial.  The process of this sort of negotiation involves “information 
bargaining” to discover the opponent’s bottom line, while 
convincingly sequencing offers and engaging in other behaviors, of 
which the negotiation literature offers a full panoply, to convince the 
opponent that the bottom line is other than where it actually is. 
The obvious way to avoid this morally distasteful, if sometimes 
subtle, dance of deception, or at least misdirection, is simply to be 
utterly candid about the underlying facts of one’s own situation as well 
as one’s bottom line.  Indeed, full candor would not involve simply 
answering questions posed by one’s negotiating partner honestly.  It 
would involve volunteering all information that each party would like 
to know.  Such candor would suggest the apparently courteous 
expedient of splitting the difference between the bottom lines, 
something that would seem to provide “equal respect” to the 
participants.  Of course, splitting the difference is dependent on a high 
level of candor from each side, candor that is inconsistent with our 
assumption of the mutual indifference of the parties and cannot 
practically be guaranteed by the usual means of incentives and 
penalties. 
Even assuming that such candor could be achieved, the moral 
appeal of splitting the difference is largely illusory.  What determines 
each party’s bottom line is his aversion to the best alternative to a 
negotiated settlement.  That aversion may stem from a range of 
particular circumstances of which my negotiating partner has no moral 
right to take advantage.  Assume that I will sell my house for $100,000 
today because I need that money today to make a necessary down 
payment for needed surgery for my child.  I normally would not 
consider a penny under $130,000.  Assume a buyer is willing to pay 
$140,000 since all equivalent houses cost $145,000.  Is it morally right 
for a buyer to learn of my exigencies and then benefit from them, 
something that splitting the difference and agreeing to the $120,000 
would implicitly do?  I would surely believe that my peculiar needs 
ought not in any way to determine the price I get from the sale. 
The ethical and legal rules that control this sort of negotiation try to 
balance the ideals of “telling the truth” and “preventing the 
negotiating partner from taking advantage.”  Because these are 
incommensurable values, we have a range of different sorts of rules 
striking slightly different balances in different jurisdictions.  The 
continuum of candor here runs from: 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art32
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(1) complete candor, including disclosure of the negotiator’s bottom 
line and his analysis of his Best Alternative To a Negotiated 
Agreement; to 
(2) full disclosure of all interests, wants, needs, and negotiating 
vulnerabilities; to 
(3) full disclosure of all the facts of the situation, of which the 
negotiator is fairly certain his negotiating partner is unaware and of 
which that partner is likely to be interested; to 
(4) disclosure only of those interests and needs where the possibility 
of collaborative bargaining to achieve a “bigger pie” outweighs the 
dangers of being “taken advantage of”; to 
(5) answering specific questions about issues of fact candidly and 
fully, but not volunteering information as in (3); to 
(6) seeking to avoid answering specific questions of fact, which 
reveal needs and desires (“blocking”), but refusing to make a false 
statement of material fact; to 
(7) failing to correct the opponent’s misunderstandings of fact or 
law that favor one’s position, while remaining scrupulous about not 
affirming or endorsing the misunderstanding; to 
(8) actively misleading the opponent as to one’s bottom line and 
one’s eagerness to settle by (a) false statements about such 
“immaterial” facts and (b) other negotiating behaviors, such as the 
sequencing and timing of offers; to 
(9) active misrepresentations as to fact and law that are likely to 
result in settling closer to one’s opponent’s bottom line. 
Although there exist in some jurisdictions authority that the line is 
drawn in a more demanding way in specific contexts,7 current norms 
forbid clearly only the last and do not require any of the more candid 
behaviors described in numbers (1) to (5). 
A good deal of the “technique” of negotiation as it is generally 
taught in law schools and in professional education programs involves 
“information bargaining” designed to reveal as much as possible 
about the opponent’s situation and positions.  This involves asking 
direct questions and listening carefully to the answer or for 
“blocking”8 attempts that often reveal that a negotiator feels morally 
 
 7. Specifically there are a few cases where lawyers have been disciplined for 
failing to disclose particularly significant facts in negotiation. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar 
Ass’n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997) (unethical for lawyer to settle case 
without disclosing client’s death to opponent); ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-397 (1995) (same); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar 
Ass’n v. Addison, 412 N.W. 2d 855 (Neb. 1987) (finding that lawyer negotiating with 
hospital on client’s behalf had an obligation to inform hospital of insurance that was a 
potential source of payment).  It is very difficult to identify the principle that emerges 
from these cases, though they certainly set the norm for specific factual contexts in the 
relevant jurisdiction. 
 8. The relative ineffectiveness of “blocking” that is not supplemented by actively 
misleading the negotiating partner is one of the reasons that negotiators subjectively 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
BURNSBP 11/12/01  8:28 PM 
2001] ETHICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING MEDIATION 695 
constrained not to lie but does not want to reveal what the opponent 
can then assume to be an answer that suggests a more favorable 
bottom line.  Of course, more skeptical negotiators do not assume that 
their opponents feel constrained even by the minimal norm expressed 
by number (9), and will be alert to determine whether or not that 
opponent is willing to lie outright about matters of fact. 
The current lawyer codes strike the following balance along this 
continuum.9  There is generally no requirement that a lawyer inform a 
negotiating partner of any fact,10 however clear it is that the negotiator 
would want to know that fact, would profit from knowing it, or suffers 
from major misunderstanding of that fact.  In that sense, they are 
wholly coherent with the share bargaining style of negotiating 
described above.  Current rules impose some limits on a purely 
strategic style by prohibiting “false statement[s] of material fact or 
law”11 to opponents.  Practically, that limits strategic misdirection 
solely to “agenda setting” that avoids whole areas that contain factual 
material of which the negotiator seeks to avoid discussion and 
“blocking” of specific inquiries.  Both these “techniques” are to some 
extent learnable, though their effective use seems largely a matter of 
the force of personality of the negotiator. 
The complexity and ambiguity of the authoritative interpretations 
of the Rule shows the depth of the tensions among the competing 
moral considerations here.  The Comment to Model Rule 4.1 provides 
some consolation to the hard bargainer:  “A lawyer is required to be 
truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf, but generally 
has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant 
facts.”12  The exception to the exception, however, can create 
situations that call for extraordinarily, if not impossibly, refined 
judgments:  “A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates 
or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is 
false.  Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act.”13  The 
Comment to the Ethics 2000 Commission version of Comment 1 to 
Rule 4.1 drops the extremely unhelpful last phrase “failure to act,” but 
substitutes language that may not be more helpful in resolving 
individual cases:  “Misrepresentations can also occur by . . . partially 
true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of 
affirmative false statements.”14 
 
feel that it is almost “unfair” to impose the relatively undemanding current standard 
of truthfulness in arms-length negotiations. 
 9. The literature on this question is already quite large.  For useful analyses, see 
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiation, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1219 (1990) 
and Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1987). 
 10. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (1999) . 
 11. R. 4.1(a). 
 12. R. 4.1 cmt. 1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 4.1 cmt. 1, at http://www.abanet.org/ 
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The Comment to the current version of the Model Rules goes on to 
incorporate language that has caused a fair degree of consternation: 
This Rule refers to statements of fact.  Whether a particular 
statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the 
circumstances.  Under generally accepted conventions in 
negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as 
statements of material fact.  Estimates of price or value placed on 
the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an 
acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the 
existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of 
the principal would constitute fraud.15 
Other than the examples provided by the Comment, there seems to be 
one other major category of statements that would be outside the 
confines of “material fact,” namely the willingness of a client to go to 
trial rather than reach a settlement.  Assume, for example, an 
observant Christian whose child has been injured in an automobile 
accident and who believes that actually going to trial is inconsistent 
with his religious beliefs.  Assume on the other side of this dispute a 
publicly held insurance company with a highly rationalized internal 
structure which takes a purely instrumental maximizing attitude 
toward its claims adjustment, justified in their minds by their legally 
defined first obligation toward their stockholders.  I believe that most 
lawyers would take the view that the client’s attitude toward 
settlement is not a “material fact” as to which the opponent is entitled 
to truthfulness. 
Thus, one of the reasons that the ABA and the states that have 
enacted versions of Rule 4.1 have been so minimalist in imposing 
obligations of truthfulness is the moral ambiguity of truthfulness as an 
ideal in the context of share bargaining.  A second reason is the 
difficulty in enforcing a rigorous rule and the strategic benefit to be 
derived by all of those likely to be privy to the knowledge that a 
lawyer has not been candid, namely that “community of two,” lawyer 
and client.  Liberal law is limited practically by its ability to actually 
create the incentives that achieve a high level of conformity.  It is true 
that cloaking a norm with the authority of law will likely increase the 
level of conformity to that norm.  But especially in competitive 
contexts where information about violations is hard to come by, law 
may be strictly limited in what it can accomplish.  My own experience 
suggests that lawyers find it extremely difficult to even conform to the 
limited obligations that the current rules impose.  Absent a sea change 
in lawyers’ sensibilities in these matters—one that powerful trends in 
law practice make less, not more, likely—and even putting aside the 
moral ambiguity of absolute candor in all negotiation situations, 
 
cpr/e2k-rule41.html. 
 15. R. 4.1 cmt. 2. 
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raising the bar on candor may well confirm an additional advantage 
on those least deserving of it.16 
This extremely strategic attitude toward truth-telling, doling out bits 
of information often out of context, may get in the way of “problem 
solving” or “integrative” styles of negotiation and the “broad 
facilitative” style of mediation that parallel it.  Problem solving is 
normally thought to require a higher level of candor between 
negotiating partners.  This is because a key aspect of the problem-
solving enterprise is to separate positions taken for the kinds of 
strategic reasons just described from the underlying interests or 
“needs” that animate the parties.  Purely positional bargaining may 
blind both parties to the negotiation of possibilities for collaboration 
(ways that “enlarge the pie” for distribution).  To give an extreme 
example, one of the classic strategic ploys is “br’er rabbit,” where the 
negotiator insists that one outcome (that he secretly desires above all) 
is the most disfavored of all outcomes.  If the opponent wants him to 
submit to that outcome, the opponent is going to have to pay a very 
high price indeed.  From a problem-solving point of view, however, 
the use of such a ploy may well prevent the negotiating partner from 
proposing alternatives that provide even more of the secretly desired 
alternative. 
Problem-solving negotiation is often a strategic choice.  Indeed the 
fundamental ethical ambiguity of Getting to Yes and its considerable 
progeny is the spirit within which a negotiator chooses the principle 
that should control the so-called principled negotiation that is thought 
more appropriate for problem solving.  There is no consideration 
offered in that book that makes the choice of principle anything other 
than strategic.  In the classic negotiation between roommates who are 
a trumpeter and a flutist about the rules that should control their 
common life, the trumpeter’s advocacy of “individual freedom to play 
whenever we want” can be no less self-interested for being fully 
principled. 
B. The Question of Client Authority 
The other set of ethical issues that surround negotiation have to do 
with the fostering of client autonomy.  Specifically, they involve the 
 
 16. The Comment to Rule 4.1 in the Ethics 2000 Commission’s version adds the 
following sentence: “Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable 
law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.” ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., 
supra note 14, Proposed R. 4.1 cmt. 2.  The last phrase should remind the lawyer that 
his obligations of truthfulness are not exhausted by the ethical rules that control 
negotiation, but may be controlled by the laws of tort and fraud.  Furthermore, since 
certain kinds of misrepresentations, or even failures to disclose, may prevent the 
meeting of the minds required for a binding contract, including the contract 
embedded in the consensual settlement of a case, a lawyer may be guilty of 
malpractice by a failure of candor that provides the basis for avoiding the agreement. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art32
BURNSBP 11/12/01  8:28 PM 
698 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70 
interpretation of Model Rule 1.2, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decision concerning the objectives of 
representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by 
which they are to be pursued.”17  The Rule provides explicitly that a 
lawyer “shall abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of 
 
 17. R. 1.2(a).  The Ethics 2000 recommendations change the relevant language to 
read “[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation . . . and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued.” ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 
1.2(a), at, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule12.html.  The Ethics 2000 
recommendations would also somewhat expand Rule 1.4, which mandates reasonable 
communication with the client, to require that a lawyer “reasonably consult with the 
client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.” ABA 
Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 1.4(a)(2), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
rule14.html.  Though the change seems insignificant, at least one commentator has 
worried that moving the provision to a Rule that addresses communication (Rule 1.4), 
rather than the division of authority (Rule 1.2), may expand the lawyer’s discretion as 
to the choice of means. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professional Rules and ADR: Control 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution Under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal 
and Other Professional Responsibility Standards, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 895, 908 
(2001).  The Comment to the new Rule 1.4 provides as follows: 
[3] Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client 
about the means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives.  In some 
situations—depending on both the importance of the action under 
consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client—this duty will 
require consultation prior to taking action.  In other circumstances, such as 
during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the 
situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation.  In such 
cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of 
action the lawyer has taken on the client’s behalf. 
 ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 1.4 cmt. 3, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
rule14.html. 
  The current Model Rules provide a demanding definition of consultation: 
“‘Consult’ or ‘consultation’ denotes communication of information reasonably 
sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.” 
Model Rules of Prof’l Responsibility, Terminology.  The Ethics 2000 
recommendations do not define consultation.  In the new scheme of the Ethics 2000 
recommendations, it is significant that a lawyer’s choice of means do not require what 
is a defined term, “informed consent.” (“‘Informed consent’ denotes the 
agreement . . . to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated 
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably 
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., 
Proposed R. 1.0(e), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule10.html).  Nor does the 
Comment to either Rule 1.2 or 1.4  in the recommendations contain the following 
language now contained in the Comment to Rule 1.2: 
A clear distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be 
drawn, and in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint 
undertaking.  In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility 
for technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the client regarding 
such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons 
who might be adversely affected. 
R. 1.2 cmt. 1. 
  The new ALI Law Governing Lawyers is clearer that the client holds ultimate 
authority with regard to means. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 21(2) (2000). 
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settlement of a matter.”18  This provision includes as an obvious 
corollary a requirement that a lawyer convey to the client any offer 
concerning which the lawyer does not already have clear authority to 
accept or reject. 
Two sorts of difficulties arise in the application of this rule.  The 
first has to do with the choice in negotiating strategy itself.  Is the 
decision to pursue a hard positional bargaining strategy or an 
integrative or problem-solving approach a choice of means or a choice 
of the goals of the representation?  It seems that it could be either.19  
If the client’s goals in the representation are solely extrinsic to the 
process—maximizing recovery in a tort claim—it would seem that 
choice of negotiating style would be a means.  If the client includes 
maintaining cordial relations with the opposing party as a goal of the 
representation, it would still seem that the choice of negotiating 
strategy is a means rather than an end, though here the choice of an 
integrative strategy might be the only competent20 one.  One could, 
however, envision a client who saw it as a goal of the representation to 
communicate with the negotiating party in a candid and non-
manipulative manner, even if that surrendered some tactical 
advantages.  Such a client would consider integrative bargaining to be 
a matter of ethics, not of strategy.  In a Kantian idiom, he might say 
not that honesty is the best policy, but that honesty is better than any 
policy.  For such a client, negotiating in a certain manner could well 
become a goal of the representation on which, according to the 
casuistry suggested by Rule 1.2, the client holds ultimate authority.21  
We will return to this subject when I consider the promise of certain 
forms of mediation to be intrinsically superior to adversary forms of 
dispute resolution and the role that a lawyer might have in mediation 
so conceived.22 
The second set of problems surrounding the application of the rule 
are practical.  In lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation, the attorneys face a 
shifting set of proposals in an indeterminate relationship to each 
other.  Often one’s opponent23 is offering trade-offs between 
possibilities, each precise combination cannot easily be anticipated 
and the movement from one to the other may be fluid.  Withdrawal 
 
 18. R. 1.2(a). 
 19. The Comment to Rule 1.2 notes that the distinction between ends and means 
is at best provisional and sometimes decidedly unhelpful. R. 1.2 cmt. 1. 
 20. R. 1.1 (noting that a lawyer shall provide competent representation). 
 21. Of course, if the lawyer regards such a course of action “repugnant or 
imprudent,” the lawyer would traditionally have the right to withdraw.  R. 1.16(b)(3). 
I would hope that few lawyers would consider integrative bargaining to be repugnant, 
though I would imagine some would think it imprudent in one or another set of 
circumstances. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. I use this term here with full knowledge that it is problematic.  For an 
integrative negotiator, the negotiating partner should not be conceived as an 
“opponent.” 
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from the negotiation to consult with the client every time a slight 
modification is tentatively proposed may be impractical and, from a 
purely strategic point of view, may reveal aspects of the client’s 
position that ought to be withheld.  I do not think there is any easy 
answer to this practical problem, though its force can be blunted by 
good initial client interviewing and a firm sense of the priorities 
among the client’s goals. 
The second difficulty in the application of the rule requiring client 
control of the goals of representation in negotiation is more a problem 
in the lawyer’s moral psychology.24  In lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation 
the attorney largely controls the pattern of offers from the opponent 
and completely controls the flow of information to the client.  The 
client is dependent on the lawyer’s reporting of the opponent’s factual 
assertions and the offers made.  More importantly, the client is 
dependent upon his lawyer’s judgment about what resolutions are 
feasible and when the opponent has reached his resistance point.  
When a lawyer says to his or her client, this point is “non-negotiable” 
or “they will not budge on this,” it is likely that the client will follow 
his lead.  Finally, the ethical rules all but prevent a lawyer from 
contacting a represented opposing party when he or she believes that 
offers (and, a fortiori, information) are not being conveyed to that 
party by his or her lawyer.25 
The client is thus highly dependent upon the lawyer’s honesty—
primarily with himself26—about what he is saying to his client and 
what he is doing in the negotiation.  And there are strong motives to 
be less than candid with oneself.  Often a lawyer will honestly believe 
that his client is not acting in her own best interests, that she is too 
willing to settle on unfavorable terms in a divorce, perhaps, simply to 
avoid even the threat of a trial that the lawyer believes is extremely 
remote.  The temptation to resort to the paternalistic manipulation of 
information here can be great.  Second, every fee structure will create 
some potential conflict of interest27 between client and lawyer.  This is 
true whether the lawyer is charging a flat fee, an hourly fee, or a 
 
 24. Several of the essays in The Good Lawyer: Lawyer’s Roles and Lawyers’ 
Ethics (David Luban ed., 1983), address the importance of considering a lawyer’s 
dispositions and moral psychology. 
 25. The Model Rules do not absolutely prohibit client-to-client contact under 
these circumstances but there is a risk here that a lawyer will be accused of 
orchestrating an improper end-run around the lawyer representing the opposing 
party.  See, e.g., Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Makridis, 671 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio 1996). 
 26. On self-deception as a particularly deadly sin, see Hannah Arendt, Between 
Past and Future 227, 254 (1968). 
 27. The phrase “conflict of interest” is not exactly apposite here.  For the lawyer’s 
obligation is not to pursue his or her client’s “interests,” as the lawyer perceives them, 
but his client’s stated goals in the representation.  A good lawyer will surely try to 
ensure, through the counseling process, that the client’s genuine interests are 
considered, but the client’s goals, not his interests, should be the standard of the legal 
representation. 
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contingent fee.  In each case, it is a matter of purely contingent fact 
that the lawyer’s financial self-interest will be exactly congruent with 
his client’s goals in the representation.  Only the lawyer’s sense of 
professional obligation—his or her “purity of heart”—can assure that 
it is the client’s goals that are being advanced.28 
II.  THE IRRELEVANCE OF MOST FORMS OF MEDIATION TO THE 
LAWYER’S OBLIGATIONS 
Broadly speaking mediation is the practice through which a third 
party engages in a conversation seeking resolution of a situation that 
the parties find problematic.  This description has to be so generic 
because the forms of mediation and the styles of mediation have 
become so diverse.  Though I cannot provide even the barest outline 
of the varying goals and methods of mediation, some description may 
be helpful as a background for a discussion of specific ethical issues 
that arise in this context and for my concluding discussion of the 
particularly interesting ethical issues surrounding one form of 
mediation:  so-called “transformative mediation.” 
The primary organization of dispute resolution professionals in the 
United States has described alternative dispute resolution’s 
“conflicting values and goals, including: 
1. increased disputant participation and control of 
the process and outcome; 
2. restoration of relationships; 
3. increased efficiency of the judicial system and 
lowered costs; 
4. preservation of social order and stability; 
5. maximization of joint gains; 
6. fair process; 
7. fair and stable outcomes; and 
8. social justice.”29 
Given that range of possible goals, it should come as no surprise 
that mediators employ a broad range of methods, some of which are 
 
 28. We try to dramatize both threats to the client’s autonomy in a simulated 
negotiation exercise in Robert P. Burns et al., Exercises and Problems in Professional 
Responsibility 35-36 (2d ed. 2001). 
 29. Ensuring Competence and Quality in Dispute Resolution Practice, Report 2 
of the SPIDR Commission on Qualifications 5 [Soc’y of Prof’ls in Dispute 
Resolution] (1995) (emphasis added), quoted in Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding 
Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 Harv. 
Negot. L. Rev. 7, 17 n.34 (1996). 
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inconsistent with those possible goals that a particular mediator (1) 
does not recognize as legitimate or important, (2) does not think 
appropriate for the particular dispute,30 or (3) must subordinate to 
other goals placed higher on the mediator’s hierarchy of values. 
The most prominent divide between mediator styles is between so-
called facilitative mediation and evaluative mediation.31  In facilitative 
mediation, the mediator takes a purely maieutic role, striving to be the 
midwife of solutions that the parties themselves propose.32  In 
evaluative mediation, a mediator is willing to offer his own solutions, 
to offer his own judgments about the workability or wisdom of the 
solutions proposed by the parties, or, at the extreme, to offer what 
seems to the mediator to be the best resolution of the problematic 
situation.33  Facilitative mediators place mediator “neutrality” high on 
their hierarchy of values and so are more willing to aid in the 
identification of solutions that are attractive to the parties, but about 
which they may have serious doubts, especially on fairness grounds.34  
Two problems beset facilitative mediators:  (1) the problem of power 
and information imbalances between the parties which may lead to 
unfair agreements and (2) the practical elusiveness of true or 
complete neutrality in the conduct of the mediation.  By contrast, 
evaluative mediators struggle with questions about the sources of their 
authority to “impose” their own values on the participants, especially 
because the parties usually do not give informed consent for 
evaluative mediation.35  If the evaluative mediator in a litigated or 
potentially litigated case offers his judgment of the appropriate terms 
of the settlement based on his own estimates of the likely outcome at 
trial, he faces empirical questions about his predictive capacities.  The 
latter is especially problematic in those cases where the parties are 
 
 30. The question of the particular kinds of problematic situations appropriate for 
mediation has been one of the most fundamental questions in the field.  The seminal 
work remains Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
305 (1971); see also Robert P. Burns, The Appropriateness of Mediation: A Case Study 
and Reflection on Fuller and Fiss, 4 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 129 (1989).  
 31. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A 
Discussion, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 919 (1997); Riskin, supra note 29. 
 32. Riskin, supra note 29, at 24. 
 33. Id. at 23-24. 
 34. It seems that facilitative mediators have fewer qualms about exploring the 
workability or practicality of the solutions offered by the parties than they do about 
addressing its fairness. 
 35. “‘Informed consent’ denotes the agreement . . . to a proposed course of 
conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation 
about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed 
course of conduct.”  ABA  Ethics  2000  Comm.,  Proposed  R.  1.0(e),  at  http://www. 
abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule10.html.  The discussions among proponents of mediation can 
become quite polemic.  See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” 
Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 Alternatives to High Cost Litig. 31 (1996); Lela P. 
Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 Fla. St. L. Rev. 
937 (1997). 
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attempting to take full advantage of mediation by resorting to it early 
in the case before formal discovery is complete.36  The disagreements 
among mediators as to the appropriate style of mediation can be 
intense.37 
Insofar as mediation is facilitated negotiation, the parties may adopt 
either of the negotiating styles already described in the course of a 
mediation.  Indeed, some of the strongest proponents of mediation as 
a method of dispute resolution have recently expressed their dismay 
at the appearance of all the ploys and methods of distributive 
bargaining in the context of mediation.38  For there are many reasons 
why a lawyer who is intent upon engaging in hard bargaining of the 
chilliest sort may still opt for mediation.  A mediator, through the 
effective use of caucuses (separate meetings with individual parties), 
may diffuse the interpersonal hostility that may cause one or more 
parties to act “irrationally,” that is, to refuse to settle even though 
settlement may be in their interest.  Even if the parties have no 
interest in integrative bargaining, a mediator who speaks to each side 
separately under protections of confidentiality may notice 
opportunities for “enlarging the pie” to which the parties were 
oblivious.  Sometimes a lawyer may correctly believe that his 
opponent overestimates the value of his case, measured by likely 
outcomes if the case goes to trial, and the likelihood a settlement will 
be enhanced by the mediator’s “reality testing,” that is, providing his 
evaluation of the case or even asking probing questions of the 
opponent.  Sometimes a lawyer may believe that the lawyer with 
whom he may negotiate lacks the credibility with his own client to 
counsel that client to accept a resolution that really is in the client’s 
interest.  And sometimes a lawyer may admit to lacking a similar 
credibility with his own client.  So it is surely possible that a lawyer 
convinced of the wisdom of a hard bargaining style will still opt for 
mediation.  Perhaps more significantly, given the prevalence of 
mandatory mediation in a large number of court systems, a share 
bargainer by choice or instinct may find himself in a mediation he or 
she did not choose. 
One author, himself an extremely reflective mediator of deep 
experience, has summarized the essential practices in which a good 
mediator engages: 
 
 36. See James S. Kakalik et al., An Evaluation of Mediation and Early Neutral 
Evaluation Under The Civil Justice Reform Act 44 (1996) (describing the problems 
that arise from referrals to mediation too early in a case). 
 37. Professor Riskin notes as well that mediators (or mediation programs) may 
choose to define the problem either “broadly” or “narrowly.”  Thus, there are four 
quadrants on his mediation grid: Evaluative-Narrow, Facilitative-Narrow, Evaluative-
Broad, and Facilitative-Broad.  Riskin, supra note 29, at 25. 
 38. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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Stated simply, the mediator has three basic strategies that operate in 
a continuing iterative cycle during the course of a mediation: 
gathering information, interpretation and diagnosis, and 
encouraging movement.  In carrying out the first two strategies the 
mediator uses active listening and intuitive and rational thinking 
skills.  For those two strategies to be effective, the parties must share 
with the mediator as much relevant information as possible 
regarding the source and status of the dispute and suggested 
proposals for resolution.  In carrying out the third strategy—the 
movement strategy—the mediator typically uses a variety of tactics 
that may be categorized under three headings:  communication, 
substantive, and procedural.39 
Even without a fuller description of the methods of a good 
mediator,40 one can see how the very same issues of candor that arise 
in negotiation inevitably arise in mediation.  Indeed, Cooley counsels 
an advocate to listen carefully to what a mediator says about his 
negotiating partner’s beliefs and positions to discern telling verbal 
clues of those beliefs and positions that his partner would prefer to 
hide.41  He counsels as well that an effective advocate in mediation 
should begin with a high reasonable offer supported by reasons, move 
off that initial offer only with several supporting reasons, “hold back 
some information favorable to you or unfavorable to the opposing 
side until the final caucuses,”42 and be careful not to reveal one’s 
bottom line to the mediator early in the mediation.43 In other words, 
the very same methods of positional bargaining, strategically 
“principled”44 negotiation, and information bargaining that a share 
bargainer might use with an opponent, can effectively be used with a 
mediator. 
The narrow ethical issue this raises is the level of candor which a 
lawyer owes to a mediator.  The mediator is surely entitled to that 
degree of candor required by Rule 4.1.  But, the latter is heavily 
qualified in the ways we have discussed above.  The remaining 
question is whether the mediator is entitled to a higher level of 
candor—specifically, whether a mediator is entitled to the protection 
of Rule 3.3, which provides in relevant part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; 
 
 39. John W. Cooley, Mediation Advocacy 114 (1996). 
 40. Id. at 117-19 (discussing strategies for effective mediation). 
 41. Id. at 118. 
 42. Id. at 121. 
 43. Id. at 116-23. 
 44. “Principled” in the sense advanced by Fisher and Ury: the use of a potentially 
strategically chosen principle to slow the movement off a position. Fisher et al., supra 
note 6, at 10-14. 
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(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is 
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; 
. . . 
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.  If a lawyer has 
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.45 
The Model Rules do not provide a definition of a “tribunal.”  The 
Ethics 2000 recommendations remedy this omission in a way that is, I 
think, consistent with the current rules: 
RULE 1.0:  TERMINOLOGY 
(m) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding 
arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency 
or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity.  A legislative body, 
administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity 
when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal 
argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment 
directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular matter.46 
It is clear that mediation would not fall under this definition of 
“tribunal.”  Indeed, it almost seems that the definition has been 
written carefully to exclude mediation from its scope.47  It appears 
then, that the same ethical obligations concerning candor that apply 
when negotiating with an “opposing party” apply to statements to the 
mediator.  Although the case could be made that a party owes a 
higher level of candor particularly to an “evaluative” mediator than to 
an opposing party, I know of no authority so holding. 
Does positional or integrative negotiation within the context of 
mediation change the ethical terrain concerning a lawyer’s obligation 
to defer to the client’s setting of goals for the representation and 
consulting on means?48  I think not, though the participation of the 
 
 45. Model Rules of Prof’l Responsibility R. 3.3 (1999). 
 46. ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 1.0(m), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ 
e2k-rule10.html. 
47.The Annotated Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct note that: 
Although the term ‘tribunal’ is not defined in the Terminology section of the 
Rules, or in Rule 3.3 or its Comment, the context in which the term is used 
in the Rules makes clear that ‘tribunal’ refers to a trial-type proceeding in 
which witnesses are questioned, evidence is presented, the parties and their 
counsel participate fully, and the decision is rendered by a fact finder. Cf. 
ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 93-375 (1993) 
(noting that disclosure provisions of Rule 3.3 do not apply to 
nonadjudicative proceedings, such as routine examinations by bank 
regulatory agency). 
Ctr. on Prof’l Responsibility, Annotated Model Rules Of Prof’l Conduct 316 (4th ed. 
1999) 
 48. Shortly, I will argue that a different form of mediation, transformative 
mediation or mediation as moral dialogue, raises more basic questions of legal ethics. 
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client in most forms of mediation may well reduce, though not 
eliminate, the dangers implicit in the lawyer’s control of the flow of 
dialogue in negotiation and in the dependence of the client on the 
lawyer for information about the settlement process.  Otherwise the 
issues surrounding client authority in the process of mediation remain 
much the same.49 
III. BASIC LAWYERING STYLES AND THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 
Many of those writers most dismayed50 at the transplantation of the 
tools of hard bargaining into the world of mediation have urged that 
the genius of mediation is its ability to enhance integrative or 
problem-solving approaches to dispute resolution.  And much of the 
proposed attraction of mediation for some of its proponents is the 
possibility it offers to transform lawyers from hired guns to “problem-
solvers” who “add value” to transactions and disputes by integrative 
methods.51  This style of mediation is not fundamentally different from 
 
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 
 49. There has been some discussion of whether a lawyer is obliged to present the 
possibility of mediation to a client who would otherwise pursue litigation (or 
negotiation) and then defer to the client’s decision.  The most complete treatment 
concludes that current Rules would have to change in order to impose such an 
obligation, a change that the author urges.  See Cochran, supra note 17, at 897; but see 
Va. Code Ann. R. pt. 6 § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (Michie 2001).  The Virginia Comment adds 
the following sentence to the Comment in the Model Rules: “In that context, a lawyer 
shall advise the client about the advantages, disadvantages, and availability of dispute 
resolution processes that might be appropriate in pursuing these objectives.” 
Cochran, supra note 17, at 902-03 (quoting Va. Code Ann. R. pt. 6 § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 1). 
 50. A federal magistrate judge, Wayne Brazil, has described the following range 
of behaviors among lawyers participating in court-annexed mediation: 
[P]ressing arguments known or suspected to specious, concealing significant 
information, obscuring weaknesses, attempting to divert the attention of 
other parties away from the main analytical or evidentiary chance, 
misleading others about the existence or persuasive power of evidence not 
yet formally presented (e.g., projected testimony from percipient or expert 
witnesses), resisting well-made suggestions, intentionally injecting hostility 
or friction into the process, remaining rigidly attached to positions not 
sincerely held, delaying other parties’ access to information, or needlessly 
protracting the proceedings—simply to gain time, or to wear down the other 
parties or to increase their cost burdens. 
Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation about the Current Status and the Future 
of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 11, 29 (2000), quoted in 
Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer 
Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem 
Solving: Mediation, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 935, 945 (2001).  Judge Brazil has also 
described the appearance of courses like “How to Win in ADR” and “Successful 
Advocacy Strategies for Mediations.” Id.  Carrie Menkel-Meadow recounts the story 
of one lawyer who threatened a potential opponent, “I am filing an ADR against 
you!”  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, 
No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. Tex. L. 
Rev. 407, 408 n.1 (1997). 
 51. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create 
Value In Deals and Disputes (2000). 
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integrative bargaining, though it may well profit from the presence of 
an imaginative and perceptive mediator who knows how to enhance 
the communication between the parties.  Once again, problem-solvers 
can be strategic and self-interested, though it is an enlightened self-
interest to which they appeal.52  This is not in any way to denigrate the 
importance of a fully competent attorney’s understanding of the 
situational advantages of the problem-solving style. 
To my mind, however, the most challenging set of ethical questions 
surrounding lawyers’ participation in mediation concerns the 
possibility and extent of a lawyer’s participation in so-called 
transformative mediation.  I have concluded above that the specific 
ethical issues that surround mediation as facilitated arms-length 
negotiation are really no different from those that surround such 
negotiation engaged in without a mediator’s intervention.  Nor is the 
ethical terrain surrounding mediation any different when it occurs in 
the so-called “problem-solving mode” that takes place for the usually 
assumed self-interested reasons. 
It is the existence of so called “transformative mediation” that 
poses the greatest challenge to the American lawyer’s “standard 
philosophical map.”53  I will argue below that such mediation is 
discontinuous with the ways in which American lawyers generally 
conceive of their roles and counsel their clients.54  By contrast, 
transformative mediation is strangely coherent with a style of 
lawyering that Professor Thomas Schaffer has described eloquently 
and at some length and calls “moral discourse.”55  That style of 
lawyering and transformative mediation are both attempts to 
transcend a kind of instrumental rationality dominant in many spheres 
of American life.  It is that style that proponents of transformational 
mediation and proponents of lawyering as moral discourse see as 
preventing the realization of basic human good; they prevent the 
realization of moral sources.56  I will argue that the dominant style of 
legal counseling makes it very difficult for a client to realize the 
benefits of transformative mediation.  On the other hand, the style of 
lawyering that Shaffer urges makes it very easy to realize those 
benefits.  The challenge for such a lawyering style is to protect a client 
against its dangers. 
 
 52. See Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 656 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, J., 
concurring) (“An attorney should explain to the client the strategic considerations 
that determine whether a jury trial or some other form of dispute resolution should be 
utilized.” (emphasis added)), quoted in Cochran, supra note 17, at 912. 
 53. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 29, 43-48, 57-59 
(1982). 
 54. See infra notes 80-84. 
 55. Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers, Clients, and Moral 
Responsibility 113-34 (1994). 
 56. On the concept of a moral source, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modern Identity (1989). 
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Those who speak of the “genius of mediation” or the “magic of 
mediation” or, in the words of the seminal work on the subject,57 “the 
promise of mediation,” are often speaking of so-called 
“transformative mediation.”  The twin goals of transformative 
mediation are mutual recognition and empowerment.  The authors 
who use this term are trying to capture something of the experience of 
moral destiny that occurs during mediation, the felt certainty that the 
parties are moving beyond their day-to-day selves in the course of the 
process and realizing aspects of their respective selves that usually 
remain dormant.  Put simply, many mediators and authors are 
convinced that this kind of mediation regularly makes the participants 
better people.58 
There have been different and quite varying attempts to provide a 
philosophical explanation or justification for this kind of mediation.  
One can be skeptical about any one explanation while remaining 
sympathetic to the basic perception that something extraordinary, 
something substantial,59 occurs in the course of some mediations.  
And, in fact, the limited or partial capacity of any one explanation 
may well be an indication of the richness of what can occur.  One 
author invokes Girard’s notion of the creation of a sacred space 
cleared by individuals’ witnessing of the mutual victimization of each 
party and becoming consciously identified with the universal norms 
violated in that kind of victimization.60  Other authors find this 
perceived richness in its felt congruence with a kind of post-modern 
“relational” society toward which we are groping and which is neither 
an individualist liberal society nor a pre-modern organic society.61 
A simpler and more traditional explanation is that 
“transformational” mediation is itself a form of distinctively moral 
discourse.  Moral discourse may always have been out of the ordinary, 
because most people have always related to each other in more 
primitive or instrumental ways.  Or there may be something to 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s view that modern market societies are so woven 
with instrumental rationality that we barely remember the moral point 
of view and the modes of moral conversation.62 
 
 57. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: 
Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition 81-112 (1994). 
 58. This is precisely the claim Shaffer makes for the form of client counseling that 
he endorses. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 59. The word invokes Hegel’s notion of  “ethical substance,” the norms that are 
already realized and embedded in the institutions and practices of a society. See 
Charles Taylor, Hegel 365-88 (1975). 
 60. See Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second-Generation Dispute 
Resolution Practice, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1017, 1022 (2001). 
 61. Bush & Folger, supra note 57, at 244. 
 62. MacIntyre has described the difference between a characteristically twentieth-
century understanding of the moral world and traditional understandings this way: 
[E]motivism entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between 
manipulative and non-manipulative social relations.  Consider the contrast 
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The center of gravity of authentically moral discourse is the 
conversation between an agent and one who is actually or potentially 
adversely affected by his actions.63  Moral conversation places actions 
into a traditional moral vocabulary that is enormously rich and which 
willy-nilly forms an important part of the identity of the speakers.64  
That vocabulary allows for a range of verbal actions:  denials, 
justifications, and excuses among them.  Moral conversation provides 
a way of 
healing tears in the fabric of relationship and of maintaining the self 
in opposition to itself or others. . . . [I]t provides a door through 
which someone, alienated or in danger of alienation from another 
through his action, can return by the offering and the acceptance of 
explanation, excuses and justifications, or by the respect one human 
being will show another who sees and can accept the responsibility 
for a position which he himself would not adopt.65 
Moral conversation need not actually achieve agreement, though the 
possibility of agreement animates the enterprise.  “The point of moral 
argument is not agreement on a conclusion, but successful [not 
strategic] clarification of two people’s positions.”66 
Its function is to make the positions of the various protagonists 
clear—to themselves and to the others.  Moral discourse is about 
what was done, how it is to be understood and assessed, what 
 
between, for example, Kantian ethics and emotivism on this point.  For 
Kant—and a parallel point could be made about many earlier moral 
philosophers—the difference between a human relationship uninformed by 
morality and one so informed is precisely the difference between one in 
which each person treats the other primarily as means to his or her ends and 
one in which each treats the other as an end.  To treat someone else as an 
end is to offer them what I take to be good reasons for acting in one way 
rather than another, but to leave it to them to evaluate those reasons.  It is to 
be unwilling to influence another except by reasons which that other he or 
she judges to be good.  It is to appeal to impersonal criteria of the validity of 
which each rational agent must be his or her own judge.  By contrast, to treat 
someone else as a means is to seek to make him or her an instrument of my 
purposes by adducing whatever influences or consideration will in fact be 
effective in this or that occasion.  The generalisations of the sociology and 
psychology of persuasion are what I shall need to guide me, not the 
standards of a normative rationality. 
Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue 22-23 (1981). 
 63. Hanna Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice 150 (1972). 
 64. As John Austin put it in a famous essay: 
[O]ur common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found 
worth drawing, an all the connexions [sic] they have found worth making, in 
the life time of many generations: these surely are likely to be more 
numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the 
survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably 
practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our 
armchairs of an afternoon—the most favored alternative method. 
John Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 Proc. of the Aristotelian Soc’y 1, 8 (1956). 
 65. Pitkin, supra note 63, at 151-52. 
 66. Id. at 153. 
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position each is taking toward it and thereby toward the other, and 
hence what each is like and what their future relations will be like.  
The hope, of course, is for reconciliation, but the test of validity in 
moral discourse will not be reconciliation but truthful revelation of 
self. . . . 
 Moral discourse is useful, is necessary, because the truths it can 
reveal are by no means obvious.  Our responsibilities, the extensions 
of our cares and commitments, and the implications of our conduct, 
are not obvious . . . the self is not obvious to the self.67 
We have other important ways of speaking on matters of moment.68  
Moral conversation has a different tone and characteristics than do 
other important forms of conversation in which we engage and which 
are constitutive of important forms of life that we regard as legitimate.  
Most significantly, it is unlike forms of political dialogue and legal 
discourse. 
There are two competing understandings of what constitutes 
“political” discourse.  I use “political” here in the ordinary language 
sense in that many different institutions, private and public, have their 
“politics.”69  The perhaps dominant interest group, liberal70 
understanding of politics, conceives it as “a tale of dominance and 
power, in which political institutions serve to protect the interests and 
property of some men against the rest; or a tale of mutual 
accommodation among essentially separate, private individuals or 
groups, each with its own needs or interests, its own claims against the 
others.”71  Within that understanding, speech in political contexts will 
tend to be manipulative rhetoric, guided by the psychology of 
persuasion, much as share bargaining conceives of negotiation.  There 
is a competing republican or deliberative understanding of political 
speech, where deliberation is “neither just manipulative propaganda, 
nor just a moral concern with the cares and commitments of another 
person, but something like an addressing of diverse others in terms 
which relate their separate, plural interests to their common 
enterprise, to a shared, public interest.”72  But, this too, is 
discontinuous with moral conversation. 
Nor, of course, is legal discourse identical with moral conversation 
in Pitkin’s distinctive sense.  Legal discourse is at least in part 
 
 67. Id. at 153-54. 
 68. In a previous article, Burns, supra note 30, I tried to demonstrate concretely 
the ways in which the parties to a mediation may move in and out of the different 
linguistic realms that correspond to different spheres of human interaction, 
specifically the moral, legal, and political. 
 69. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil 7 (1984) (arguing 
that genuine politics exists in many nongovernmental contexts). 
 70. See Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (2d ed. 1979). 
 71. Pitkin, supra note 63, at 211. 
 72. Id. at 216 (emphasis added). 
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“formalistic.”  Metaphors of “construction” that invoke “craft” are 
likely to be the most illuminating here.  Much of legal discourse, in 
different ways at different levels, involves the fitting of a particular 
situation within a structure of authoritative categories while subtly 
modifying those categories to accommodate new situations.  We need 
this worldly legal structure to maintain our distance from one 
another—Arendt talks about the importance of the legal system in 
maintaining the “hedges” between men73—and so to maintain our 
freedom.  (Totalitarian regimes press us up against each other to the 
point where we cannot speak and act freely.)74  Speech within that 
structure has a kind of generality and impersonality that is 
discontinuous with moral speech in the sense that I have described.  
Much of it involves maintaining “positions” that are determined by 
the operative legal categories.  Speakers wear masks and speak from 
behind them.75 
All this is a fancy way of saying that people do, and think they 
should, talk differently in different contexts.  “Moral” is an analogous 
term, and that speech within the political realm, the legal realm, the 
market, and what we normally call the “moral” sphere (that 
controlling face-to-face interpersonal relations) can in that analogous 
sense be “moral.”  This is true even though the distinctive languages 
and spirits of these spheres are, as we have seen, quite different.  This 
is true even if the legal world and the economic world are in one sense 
“artificial,” even “mechanical.”76 
Almost everyone accepts some version of this view.  Very few 
persons believe that all political and legal discourse is wrong.77  But 
philosophical questions surrounding the appropriate relationships 
among these realms abound.  One set of questions surround the 
flexibility of the boundaries within the spheres:  whether there is a 
political dimension to law or a moral dimension to politics, for 
example, and if so, how should we understand these relationships.  
There is another set of problems concerning the extent to which the 
legal and political are always second best, a concession of the darkness 
of the human heart and so always to be avoided if possible.  Further, 
views exist that there is a single line of “progress” by which one of the 
spheres “colonizes” or “should colonize” the others.  For some, 
“progress” involves the extension of the market at the expense of the 
 
 73. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 429-39 (1951). 
 74. See id. at 376-98. 
 75. See John Noonan, The Persons and Masks of The Law: Cardozo, Holmes, 
Jefferson, and Wythe and Makers of the Masks (1976). 
 76. John MacMurray, Persons in Relation 153 (1961) (noting that the personal 
world depends on artificial, not organic, structures). 
 77. The exceptions tend to be radical antinomian forms of Christianity for whom 
life within the kingdom of God precludes interacting in legal or political contexts.  It 
is not surprising that such forms of Christianity find mediation a peculiarly 
appropriate form of dispute resolution. 
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political sphere, or vice-versa, or the gradual withering away or 
qualification of strict market relations by modes of human interaction 
controlled by moral norms in the narrower sense, a sense in which 
there is a relatively lower level of purely instrumental interaction.  
The reader will recognize the contemporary exponents of each of 
these views and the visions of the human good that underlie them. 
Lawyers’ professional identities seem closely wound up with 
political and legal discourse.  After all, if there were no political and 
legal worlds, there would be no lawyers.  What place do lawyers have 
in moral discourse, and therefore in transformative mediation?  I have 
argued that the distinctive training and, much more importantly, the 
distinctive experience of a lawyer, particularly a litigator,78 inclines 
lawyers to a tone-deafness to the language spoken in distinctively 
moral conversations.79  On the other hand, that same training and 
experience make lawyers sensitive to the distortions and corruption of 
those kinds of conversations.  The central question concerns what 
lawyers may contribute to a situation that can be resolved through 
moral conversation.  Is the lawyer’s function to stand on the sidelines 
here and consistently remind his or her client of the dangers of moral 
conversation, of the dangers of being manipulated, however subtly, by 
someone who is playing by different rules?  Is the lawyer to be a 
partisan of political and legal discourse over moral discourse? 
Of course, there is no one American lawyering style.80  It seems to 
me, though, that the dominant style among lawyers who are self-
conscious about their role is first to enhance the client’s autonomy, the 
client’s effective freedom.  This self-understanding is dominant in the 
most widely used texts in interviewing and counseling.81  It is shared 
by lawyers from varied practice backgrounds.82  The lawyer’s role here 
 
 78. See William F. Coyne Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 Ohio St. J. on 
Disp. Resol. 367 (1999) (suggesting that litigators should not be involved at the 
settlement stage); James E. McGuire, Why Litigators Should Use Settlement Counsel, 
18 Alternatives to the High Cost of Litig. 107 (2000);. 
 79. See Robert P. Burns, A Lawyer’s Truth: Notes for a Moral Philosophy of 
Litigation Practice, 3 J. L. & Relig. 229, 252-63 (1985). 
 80. Thomas Schaffer has identified four approaches to legal representation: 
lawyer as godfather; lawyer as hired gun; lawyer as guru; and lawyer as friend.  The 
godfather style is dominant among advocates and stresses the lawyer’s real power to 
achieve a stylized view of the client’s interest.  The guru style is an older, nobless 
oblige of the “gentleman lawyer,” who makes moral decisions for the client in a 
paternalistic manner.  The other styles are discussed in the text. Shaffer & Cochran, 
supra note 55, at 5-52. 
 81. See, Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Interviewing, Counseling, 
and Negotiating: Skills for Effective Representation (1990); David A. Binder et al., 
Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991); David A. Binder & 
Susan C. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach 
(1977). 
 82. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the 
Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976); Steven Wexler, Practicing Law 
for Poor People, 79 Yale L.J. 1049 (1970); see also Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s 
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is to help the client realize, and in some versions to maximize, his 
satisfactions through the use, perhaps the manipulation, of a 
somewhat alien legal system.  The counseling function follows a 
competent fact interview that allows the lawyer to ascertain how the 
legal system will likely categorize the situation and therefore the 
probabilities of achieving one or another of the client’s possible 
objectives.83  In counseling, the lawyer seeks to identify the client’s 
goals and then to help the client weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages, as measured by the client’s own goals, of each possible 
course of action.  Although proponents of “client-centered 
counseling” disagree about the precise place of the lawyer’s own 
moral judgments in the process,84 the overwhelming thrust of this 
lawyering style is to realize the client’s preexistent goals through the 
devices of the legal system.  As Edward Dauer and Arthur Leff put it 
more dramatically: 
The client comes to a lawyer to be aided when he feels he is being 
treated, or wishes to treat someone else, not as a whole other 
person, but (at least in part) as a threat or hindrance to the client’s 
satisfaction in life.  The client has fallen, or wishes to thrust someone 
else, into the impersonal hands of a just and angry bureaucracy.  
When one desires help in those processes whereby and wherein 
people are treated as means and not as ends, then one comes to 
lawyers, to us.85 
How would such a lawyer treat the proposal that a client engage in 
mediation?  He would weigh the probability that mediation was more 
or less likely to achieve the client’s satisfactions, as determined in the 
course of a lawyer-client conversation in which the lawyer was seeking 
to identify the client’s goals, as determined by the client’s 
predetermined values.  And, of course, it is possible that facilitative or 
evaluative mediation in which the lawyer negotiated using positional 
or problem-solving methods could do just that. 
How would a client-centered lawyer consider that option and advise 
his or her client?  Particularly, how would a lawyer understand what 
he or she is doing if transformative mediation really is equivalent to 
what we understand to be simply moral discourse?  This places the 
client-centered lawyer in a strange position.  His task is to counsel the 
client as to whether mediation is likely to be the method by which he 
will best realize his interests or satisfactions.  However, transformative 
mediation, genuine moral dialogue, may well place a client in a 
 
Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. 
Found. Res. J. 613 (1986) (offering justification for lawyer’s amoral ethical role). 
 83. Of course, this can be done only in a preliminary way in a first interview. 
 84. See Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 55, at 19-27. 
 85. Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 
Yale L.J. 573, 581 (1977), quoted in Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 55, at 18. 
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situation where he is likely to relinquish his ability to achieve his 
interests.  How should we understand this paradox? 
A distinctively modern philosophical position is that the moral 
point of view, with its traditional vocabulary, and its root commitment 
to non-instrumental speech, is a matter of choice.  In its classical 
expression, it is a choice between subjecting oneself to traditional 
moral norms and to the non-instrumental speech that accompanies 
those norms, on the one hand, and a way of life that involves the 
freedom, that is to say, “autonomy,” to pursue satisfaction as it 
appears to the individual, on the other.  When the modern lawyer 
helps the client decide whether he wants to engage in transformative 
mediation, he is engaged in a kind of distinctively modern 
conversation.  And, some would argue that it is an incoherent 
conversation, because morality cannot be a matter of choice—it 
imposes its obligations categorically.86  The very practices of client-
centered counseling are inconsistent with an understanding of 
mediation as moral discourse.  The moral point of view has a kind of 
absoluteness.87  You cannot weigh acting morally, speaking morally in 
this case, against other possible satisfactions.  The problem of the 
relation between client-centered lawyering and transformative 
mediation is clear:  you can’t get there from here. 
The situation for Shaffer’s understanding of legal counseling seems 
just the opposite.  Transformative mediation is completely continuous 
with client counseling as moral dialogue.  And so, the problem is how 
to avoid or escape from transformative mediation in those cases where 
it is inappropriate, where the situation should be treated “politically” 
or legally.  Shaffer recommends his style of client counseling in the 
following terms: 
The client-centered counselors suggest that after identifying the 
alternatives, the lawyer and client consider the advantages and 
disadvantages to the client of each alternative.  Under their model, 
effects on others are considered only if they might affect the client.  
We suggest that the lawyer and the client list the likely effects on 
others as factors with independent significance.  This may convey to 
clients that they should consider the interests of others as well as the 
interests of clients, but we think that is a good thing to convey.  
Some might say that the lawyer here is “imposing his or her morals” 
on the client.  But we think that the lawyer is only pointing to 
reality—and effects on others if a real part of the law office 
decision.88 
Shaffer suggests that the conversation between the lawyer and the 
client itself be a kind of moral conversation.  He suggests that the 
lawyer articulate the reasonable perspectives of others with whom the 
 
 86. See Macintyre, supra note 62, at 39-45. 
 87. Burns, supra note 79, at 240-43. 
 88. Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 55, at 120 (footnote omitted). 
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client has his or her problems and resist the easy instinct to become a 
single-minded partisan of the client’s self-absorbed perspective.  He 
suggests further that the lawyer should “introduce moral judgment as 
a legitimate objective,”89 while being careful not to “make . . . a just 
resolution of the dispute and then impose it on clients.”90 
If clients are to fully participate in decisions, and experience the 
moral development that we feel is an important part of the attorney-
client relationship (or the autonomy that others feel is at the heart of 
it), lawyers must be careful not to announce and insist on their 
perception of justice.  (Lawyers often have enough power to do 
that.)  The client must be a partner.91 
It can be no surprise that mediation is a natural way to continue, 
this time with the persons with whom the client has his problem, the 
very dialogue that the lawyer has initiated with his client.  
Transformative mediation easily develops out of Shaffer’s notion of 
lawyer-client moral dialogue.  In fact, in the extended example Shaffer 
offers of what that kind of dialogue would look like, he suggests that 
mediation would be the form of dispute resolution that can continue 
that very moral dialogue. 
What further role does the lawyer committed to moral dialogue 
have once he or she and the client have decided that they want to 
resolve their dispute through the further moral dialogue that 
mediation provides?  Transformative mediation seems to require that 
the client himself participate in the mediation.92  It seems to me that a 
 
 89. Id. at 126. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (emphasis added).  This sort of dialogue is consistent with the notion of 
moral judgment that Shaffer borrows from philosopher Gerald Postema: 
Judgment is neither a matter of simply applying general rules to particular 
cases nor a matter of mere intuition.  It is a complex faculty, difficult to 
characterize, in which general principles or values and the particularities of 
the case both play important roles.  The principles or values provide a 
framework within which to work and a target at which to aim.  But they do 
not determine decisions.  Instead, we rely on our judgment to achieve a 
coherence among the conflicting values which is sensitive to the particular 
circumstances.  Judgment thus involves the ability to take a comprehensive 
view of the values and concerns at stake, based on one’s experience and 
knowledge of the world.  And this involves awareness of the full range of 
shared experience, beliefs, relations, and expectations within which these 
values and concerns have significance. 
Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63, 
68 (1980).  For a similar notion of the complexity of moral decision-making, see 
Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy 69 (1986).  Shaffer provides a more detailed description of what these 
kinds of conversations would look like.  Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 55, at 119-34. 
 92. John Cooley’s advice to advocates involved in mediation seems to suggest that 
the decision to allow the client to speak extensively in the mediation process is 
normally a strategic decision. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: 
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 
Minn. L. Rev. 1317 (1995). 
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lawyer could be a participant in the kind of moral dialogue that 
transformative mediation promises, though it surely will require a 
kind of imagination and dialogue that contrasts sharply with the kind 
required by litigation.  Experience will, of course, be a much better 
guide than logic here, as to whether lawyer involvement is consistent 
with the central moral goals of this important form of mediation. 
Further, even Bush and Folger recognize that not all problematic 
situations are appropriate for mediation and it may often be true that 
a decision about appropriateness cannot really be made until after the 
mediation has commenced.  Indeed their argument for a style of 
mediation that is sharply distinctive presupposes the existence of 
other institutions—courts, for example—that function through 
different languages and with different priorities.  Can the lawyer 
committed to Shaffer’s vision of legal counseling and mediation as 
moral dialogue act as a kind of bridge between the moral realm and 
the more public worlds of law and politics? 
Historically, American lawyers, even those who were committed to 
a style of law practice far less strictly instrumental than those currently 
dominant, have viewed themselves as somewhat world-weary figures 
standing against the dangers of “enthusiasm,” perhaps especially 
religious enthusiasm.93  Some clients are naïve.  Many poor and 
working class Americans have their disputes with highly rationalized 
bureaucracies represented by lawyers who practice in a highly 
instrumental style.94  Many of those lawyers could hardly imagine any 
other style of resolving disputes.  And there may be ranges of disputes 
where individual moral dialogue is simply an inappropriate mode of 
social ordering, while others are appropriate, even morally 
appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Is there a legitimate function for a lawyer committed to the primacy 
of moral dialogue to provide the escape routes for a client engaged in 
a moral dialogue in a mediation where that kind of dialogue proves 
impossible or goes bad?  Is it possible for a lawyer to protect his client 
without constantly whispering in his ear during mediation that his 
interests are in danger, without undermining exactly what this kind of 
mediation may accomplish?  Even if moral dialogue is generally the 
best path, it is not always the best path.  Even if it should be given 
every chance, it is sometimes not available.  A lawyer is usually 
someone who knows the legal, political, and bureaucratic worlds 
 
 93. Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America From the Revolution to the 
Civil War 15-18 (1965). 
 94. See, e.g., Peter Robinson, Contending with Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: A 
Cautiously Cooperative Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50 Baylor L. Rev. 963 
(1998). 
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better than most individual clients of modest means.  His task is to put 
this knowledge to the service of clients without imposing a style of 
purely instrumental thinking and speaking that may make clients 
worse.  The only real certainty is that the interpersonal and legal skills 
necessary to fulfill this role are extremely subtle. 
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